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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
his clients. The incipiency doctrine and the test dealing with elimi-
nation of substantial competitors have been made presumptions of
illegality rather than aids in determining whether there is a "rea-
sonable probability" of adverse effects on competition. Undoubtedly,
the Court will not allow the rationale of the instant case to be
extended ad infinitum, but in the meantime, absent further clarifica-
tion, the law has become doubtful. Perhaps the fault of this deci-
sion lies in the fact that it should have been tempered with con-
siderations of other relevant economic factors.
The history of litigation under the Celler-Kefauver Amend-
ment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act has demonstrated an in-
creasingly antagonistic attitude on the part of the Supreme Court
toward mergers and acquisitions which may have anticompetitive
characteristics. The instant case led Mr. Justice Stewart to say
in his dissent that the only underlying principle of the majority
opinion must be that "in litigation under § 7, the Government always
wins." 36
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 -
PROVISIONS INVOLVED HELD CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPROPRIATE
MEANS FOR IMPLEMENTING FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT. - The State
of South Carolina brought an action to enjoin the United States At-
torney General from enforcing the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 1 which deal with the suspension of eligibility tests, the
appointment of federal examiners, and the review of proposed changes
in state voting qualifications. The Supreme Court, upholding the con-
stitutionality of the provisions of the act before it, held that they
were appropriate means for carrying out congressional responsi-
bilities under the fifteenth amendment, and were consonant with all
other relevant constitutional requirements. South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
A major responsibility of Congress is to provide appropriate
implementation of the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment.
Adopted in 1870, this amendment provides that the right to vote
"shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 2
In May 1870, immediately after ratification of the fifteenth amend-
ment, a statute was enacted to enforce the right to vote in federal
36 Supra note 30, at 301.
1 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-75 (hereinafter cited as Voting Rights
Act of 1965).2 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV, § 1.
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and state elections.3  This act restated the right of all citizens to
vote without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude; subjected to criminal penalties state officials who denied any
citizen the equal opportunity to qualify to vote; and penalized those
who used force, threats, or other unlawful means to obstruct the
free exercise of this right to vote. In 1871, Congress further pro-
vided for the appointment of Federal Supervisors who were to
challenge any unqualified person offering to register, while causing
to be registered any applicant possessing the necessary qualifica-
tions. Upon application by a specified number of citizens to the
local circuit, the court was authorized to appoint supervisors for
registration and election periods.4
In 1894, however, as "fervor for racial equality waned,"
Congress repealed most of the provisions of the Enforcement Acts,6
thus returning to the states the primary responsibility for the conduct
of elections. Several general voting rights provisions survived:
(1) a statutory declaration of each citizen's right to vote without
regard to race or color ;7 (2) two provisions creating civil liability
on the part of persons " who conspire to interfere with a citizen's
right to vote; 9 and (3) two sections 10 imposing criminal sanctions
on persons who hinder a citizen in his attempt to exercise his
right to vote."
From 1871 to 1957, Congress failed to enact any additional
legislation to enforce the provisions of the fifteenth amendment.
12
This eighty-year drought in federal civil rights legislation was
ended with the passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act.13  The act
3 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
4 16 Stat. 433 (1871). This Act was held to be a constitutional exercise
of congressional authority in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879),
wherein a conviction was upheld charging an election official with interfering
with the appointed supervisors.
5 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966).
6 28 Stat. 36 (1894).7 RL. STAT. §2004 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §1971(a)(1) (1964).
s A person under this section does not include a state or a subdivision
thereof acting in its sovereign as distinguished from its proprietary capacity.
Hewitt v. City of Jacksonville, 188 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 835 (1951).
9pRv. STAT. §§ 1979-81 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1964).
10 16 Stat. 141, 144, now 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964).
"1 These five provisions did little to protect Negro voting rights. Be-
tween 1898 and 1908, eleven states enacted measures calculated to make the
franchise exclusively white, the most common devices being literacy tests
and poll taxes. 1959 Civm RIGHTS Comm'N REP. 31-32.
12 In 1939, Congress did include as part of the Hatch Act a provision
making it a crime to intimidate any person in the exercise of his voting
rights in an election of federal officials. 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), 18 U.S.C.§ 594 (1964). This provision has apparently never been used to combat
racially motivated voter discrimination. See 1961 CiVL RI(GHTS Coi'e
lhEP. 74.
1371 Stat 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a)-(d), 1975(c), 1995 (1964).
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empowered the Attorney General to institute suits to prevent any
deprivation of the right to vote because of race or color, and
prohibited the employment of threat and intimidation for the pur-
pose of interfering with the right to vote in federal elections. The
act, however, proved to be ineffective in protecting the rights of
a significant number of people. It was hampered not only by
the fact that its sanctions could be invoked only by court action
against specified persons, but also by the inability to gain access
to voting records."4
The Civil Rights Act of 1960 was enacted in an attempt to
cure this latter problem. It provided the Attorney General with
the power to inspect the documents in the custody of the local
voting registrars.' 5  Where a pattern or practice'G of discrimina-
tion was found, the act permitted Negroes in the affected area,
whose application had been rejected by local officials, to apply
through the Attorney General to a federal court or to a federal
voting referee, if one had been appointed, for an order certifying
them as eligible to vote. The act further attempted to afford
widespread relief by providing for joinder of the state as a party
defendant in any suit involving voting rights. Although it was
expected that the use of voting referees would be the most effec-
tive provision of the 1960 Act, in many instances where patterns
of discrimination were obvious, the courts declined to make such
a finding or appoint referees.' 7  As a result, it would appear that
the most significant innovation was the authority vested in the
Attorney General to seek relief applicable to many persons in the
context of a suit brought on the part of a few. Yet, litigation
still had to be conducted separately in each registration district,
and was thus vulnerable to the tactics of delay which are often
utilized in civil rights litigation.'"
In 1964, Congress again attempted to remedy the defects of
existing legislation by passing an omnibus Civil Rights Act. 9
Title I provided for expedition of voting suits before a three-
judge federal district court with direct appeal to the Supreme
12 U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. Nzws 2544 (1965).
1574 Stat. 86 (1960), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(e), 1974(e), 1975 (1964).
16 For occasions when the courts have found a pattern or practice see
United States v. Crawford, 229 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. La. 1964); United
States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962). The court failed
to find the required prerequisites in United States v. Fox, 211 F. Supp. 25
(E.D. La.), aff'd, 334 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1964).
'7 Kommers, The Right to Vote And Its Implementation, 39 No=n DAme
LAw. 365, 388 (1964).
18 See United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 893 (1963), where the government's request for a temporary in-
junction was delayed for eight months by the use of dilatory motions.




Court. The statute also prohibited the states from establishing
voting qualifications in federal elections different from those ap-
plied under prior law with respect to registration conducted under
state law. The enactment also prohibited rejection of applicants
because of immaterial errors in registration forms, and the use
of literacy tests as a qualification for voting unless they were
administered in writing and a copy given to the applicant.
Despite this more extensive legislation, its aims were never.
fully achieved due to the intransigence of state and local officials
and the delays inherent in the judicial process. Between 1957
and 1964, the Department of Justice instituted seventy-one voting
rights cases to which an incredible amount of time was devoted-
often as much as six thousand man-hours per case.20 This case-
by-case litigation approach afforded those who were determined
to resist congressional sanction plentiful opportunity to do so.
21
Even where some registration had been achieved, Negro voters
were sometimes discriminatorily purged from voter registration
rolls.
22
The need for stronger measures is amply demonstrated by the
voting record in Dallas County, Alabama, of which Selma is the
county seat.23  Dallas County has a voting-age population of ap-
proximately 29,500, of whom about 14,500 are white persons and
about 15,000 are Negroes. In 1961, 9,195 whites---64 per cent of
the white voting-age total, and 156 Negroes-1 per cent of their
total-were registered to vote. The Department of Justice brought
an action against the County Board of Registrars. 24  Thirteen
months later the suit reached trial. Although the Department of
Justice proved discrimination on the part of the registrars who
were no longer in office,2 5 the court found that the board of
registrars then in office had not engaged in discriminatory acts
and practices and refused to issue an injunction. 20 Two and one-
half years after the suit was originally filed, the court of appeals 27
reversed the district court and ordered it to enter an injunction
against discriminatory practices by the present board and its suc-
cessors. The court refused to hold that Negro applicants must be
2o 2 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. Nmvs 2441 (1965).
21 United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925, 974 (1964) (dissenting
opinion), rev'd, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
22 United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), affd sub noin.
United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960).
23 The case study is taken from 2 U.S. CoDE COXG. & AD). NEWS 2441-42(1965).)4 United States v. Atkins, 210 F. Supp. 441 (S.D. Ala. 1962), revd,
323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963).
2 5 Fourteen Negroes were registered betveen 1954 and 1960. 2 U.S.
CoDE CONG. & AD. Navs 2441 (1965).2O Supra note 24, at 443-44.
27 United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963).
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judged by the same lenient standards that had been applied to
white applicants for the eight-year period during which these dis-
criminatory practices had prevailed.2
Between 1962 and 1964, registrars in Dallas County attempted
to continue discrimination by slowing down registration. Finally,
in 1964, the local officials devised a new test whereby applicants
were required to demonstrate their ability to spell and understand.
Applicants in Selma were required both to spell such words as
"emolument," "despotism" and "apportionment," and "to give a
satisfactory interpretation of one of a number of excerpts from
the Constitution . . . ." 0
In March 1964, the Department of Justice filed a motion in
the original Dallas County case initiating a second full-scale at-
tempt to end discriminatory practices in the registration process
in that county.31 On February 4, 1965, nearly four years after
the suit was brought, the district court finally enjoined the
use of the complicated literacy and knowledge-of-government tests,
and entered orders designed to deal .with the serious problem of
delay
3 2
The difficulties which were experienced in Dallas County are
typical of such discrimination on a broader scale. Many states
have violated the fifteenth amendment by the use of tests and
devices, the most common of which is the literacy test.33 For
example, in United States v. Louisiana, where the Government
challenged the validity of the state's constitutional interpretation test,
the three-judge court found "massive evidence" that registrars dis-
criminated against Negroes in a pattern based on unequal applica-
tion of tests.34 In United States v. Alabama,9 the court invalidated
28Id. at 741-45.
29 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEvs 2442 (1965).
39 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Even after four years of litigation, only 383 out of 15,000 eligible
Negro voters were registered, i.e., an increase of 227 voters. 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2442 (1965). Similar situations existed in Mississippi
and Louisiana:
State 9o Increase in Negro Registration Years
Alabama 5.2 to 19.4 1958-64
Mississippi 4.4 to 6.4 1954-64
Louisiana 31.7 to 31.8 1956-65
Id. at 2441.
3 See generally Maggs & Wallace, Congress and Literacy Tests:
A Comment on Constitutional Power and Legislative Abnegation, 27 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 510 (1962); Note, The 1965 Voting Rights Act and Stdte
Literacy Tests, 30 ALBANY L. Rxv. 112 (1966); Note, The Constitutionality
of Federal Legislation To Abolish Literacy Tests: Civil Rights Commission's
1961 Report on Voting, 30 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 723 (1962).
34225 F. Supp. 353, 381 (E.D. La. 1963), aft'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1964).
35304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiarn, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
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application procedures which were used in a plan to discriminate
against Negroes. Often, whites were not required to take the
tests at all.36 The registrars have also utilized a voucher require-
ment to effect discrimination. They have required Negroes, but
not whites, to produce supporting witnesses to vouch for them,3 7
and in some instances they have required Negroes to produce
whites to vouch for them.38 In sum, it was the history of repeated
legislative frustration in the attempt to correct voting imbalances,
joined with the prevalance of new and more subtle discriminatory
devices, which led to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.
The Act provides for limited administrative regulation of
voter registration and elections in a certain restricted class of
states and political subdivisions. In such states and subdivisions,
the government can insure and enforce voting rights without initial
recourse to litigation. This is accomplished by the automatic
suspension of literacy tests and other devices in certain areas and,
if necessary, the appointment of federal examiners to register
applicants. Section 4 provides that the specific provisions of the
Act apply to those states and subdivisions in which (1) discrimina-
tory tests or devices were maintained on November 1, 1964 and
(2) less than 50 per cent of the residents of voting age were
registered for or voted in the presidential election of 1964. The
Attorney General is vested with the power to determine which
states and subdivisions maintained such tests or devices. The
Director of Census reports those states in which less than 50
per cent have registered or voted.3 9 When the determinations of the
Attorney General and the Director of Census have been published
in the Federal Register, a state or subdivision covered thereby will
be prohibited from denying any person the right to vote because
of his failure to comply with a literacy test or any other device.
To prevent the use of voter qualification tests other than those
specifically mentioned in the Act, a section 4(b) state or sub-
division is further prohibited from enforcing or using any qualifica-
tion for voting different from those in effect on November 1,
1964, without first receiving administrative or judicial approval.40
36 See United States v. Clement, 231 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. La. 1964)
wherein it was stated: "Professionally trained Negroes were rejected on
the basis of the oral tests, while white persons with sixth grade education
and less were registered without taking the test at all." Id. at 915.
3 United States v. Ward, 222 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 349 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1965), modified on rehearing, 352
F2d 329 (5th Cir. 1965).
asUnited States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962).
3 Under Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, these decisions
are not judicially reviewable.
-0 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5.
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The Court in the instant case was faced with the task of
answering South Carolina's contention that the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 exceeded the powers of Congress and encroached on an
area reserved to the states by the Constitution.41 The Court noted
that the ground rules for resolving the question were clear.
The language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, the prior decisions
construing its several provisions, and the general doctrines of constitutional
interpretation, all point to one fundamental principle. As against the re-
served powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.
42
Congress derives its power to enact this legislation from
section 2, the enforcement provision, of the fifteenth amendment.43
The Court noted that the basic test of constitutionality to be ap-
plied was the one espoused by Chief Justice Marshall in MfcCulloch
v. Maryland.44  "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are con-
stitutional." 4 5 Therefore, the Court rejected the argument that
under the -fifteenth amendment Congress could do no more than
forbid violations of the amendment.
40
In evaluating the actions of Congress, the 'Court employed a
twofold approach: (1) was there a need for legislation, and (2)
were the specific remedies prescribed in the Act appropriate for
combating the evil? The Court reasoned that Congress had found
that case-by-case litigation was inadequate, because of the amount
of time and energy required to eliminate voter discrimination.
Therefore, "Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of
time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims." 47
In considering the specific remedies afforded by the Act, the
Court, drawing on the history of discrimination against the Negro,
concluded in all instances that the remedies provided were legitimate
responses "for which there is ample precedent in fifteenth amend-
ment cases." 48
Mr. Justice Black dissented from the holding of the majority
as to section 5 of the Act. He objected to the provision that a
section 4(b) state could not amend its laws as to voting qualifica-
4' South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966).
42Id. at 324.
43Preamble, Voting Rights Act of 1965.
- 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1803).
45M. at 421.
46 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra note 41, at 326.
47 Id. at 328.
48 Id. at 334.
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tions without judicial approval, arguing that no justiciable con-
"troversy could arise from the desire of the United States govern-
ment -to determine in advance what legislative enactments a state
could adopt.
By requiring a State to ask a federal court to approve the validity of a
'proposed law which has in no way become operative, Congress has asked
the State to secure precisely the type of advisory opinion our Constitution
forbids.49
Mr. Justice Black also maintained that the means used to
enforce the fifteenth amendment were not appropriate and there-
fore invalid. By requiring the states "to beg" federal authorities
to approve their legislation, our constitutional structure of govern-
ment becomes so distorted "as to render any distinction drawn in
the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaning-
less." 0 This federal law, in Mr. justice Black's view, "approaches
dangerously near to wiping the States out as useful and effective
units in the government of our country." 51
The majority reasoned that exceptional conditions can justify
legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.52  Congress knew
that some of the states covered by section 4(b) had resorted to
extraordinary new rules for the purpose of perpetuating discrimina-
tion, and had reason to suspect that the states might attempt similar
tactics to avoid the remedies of the voting act. "Under the com-
pulsion of these unique circumstances, Congress responded in a
permissibly decisive manner." 53
Although the federal constitution contains several provisions
concerning elections,"' the only provisions establishing voter quali-
fications are found in Article I, section two and in the seventeenth
amendment. It is provided that the qualifications for electors of
representatives and senators respectively shall be the same as those
for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.
The effect of these provisions is to vest in the states the power
to set voter qualifications for federal elections. 5 Under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Congress has, for the first time, expressly
affected state voter qualifications. 6 In the past, Congress had
491d. at 357-58 (dissenting opinion).5Id. at 358.
51 Id. at 360.
52 See Hdfme-- Bldg. -& Loan Ass'n v.- Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
53 Supra note 41, at 335.
MU.S. Corsr. art. I, §§2, 4; U.S. CoNsT. anends. XIV, XV, XVII,
XIX, XXIV.
SsLassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959);
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
56 Note, The 1965 Voting Rights Act and State Literacy Tests, 30 ALBAxY
L. REv. 112, 116 (1966).
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acknowledged the validity of state regulations and had simply
sought their proper and impartial enforcement.5 7  Since it is clear
that the current legislation has gone beyond this, it could be argued
that Congress has exceeded its enumerated powers. It would seem
clear, however, that the power of Congress is not limited to puni-
tive measures for proven wrongs. In fact, the grant of power in
section 2 of the fifteenth amendment includes not only the power
to strike down the strictly illegal but also the power to eliminate
any substantial risk of violation of this amendment.53 In addition,
therefore, even though a state may cease to discriminate, it still
imay validly be subjected to the "suspension" provisions of the
Act. 9
The impact of this decision and the Voting Rights Act has
already been felt in the South. Prior to 1965, 2.8 million of the
approximately 5 million voting age Negroes still remained un-
registered after eight years of litigation." Indeed, only slightly
more than 36,000 Negroes have been registered in those counties
where suits had been brought by the Justice Department."1 In
contrast, by October 30, 1965, 56,789 Negro voters had already
been listed by federal examiners in 20 counties. In the same ten-
week period, an additional 110,000 Negroes were registered by
local officials where examiners had not been assigned.6 2  The
emergence of substantial Negro voting power in the South should
have an incalculable effect on Southern politics in the future.
The historic struggle for the realization of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom to vote indicates clearly that our national
achievements in this area have fallen far short of our aspirations.
The history of fifteenth-amendment litigation in the Supreme
Court reveals both the variety of means used to bar Negro voting
and the durability of such discriminatory policies. The instant
case introduces the possibility of major changes in the present
distribution of state and federal responsibility for elections. Un-
less those states and the officials of those states affected by the
Act forcefully uphold the commands of the fifteenth amendment,
the federal government will be compelled to intervene to insure
that everyone qualified be allowed to vote. Congress has not at-
tempted to substitute federal for state law, but, on the contrary,
has merely attempted to guarantee the citizens of the various states
an equal voice in the making of those laws.
57 Ibid.
58 Cox, Constitutionality of the Proposed Voting Rights Act of 1965,
3 HousToN L. REv. 1, 5 (1966).
59 Ibid.GO N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1965, § E, p. 4, col. 4.
,61 U.S. Cohi'N ON CIVL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT 9 (1965).
62 Id. at 2.
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